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Abstract 
The evidence supporting the argument that enforcement makes environmental policies effective is 
limited with respect to geographical scope, enforcement tools, and regulatory context. This paper 
examines non-US evidence on criminal enforcement in the context of illegal waste disposal using a 
county-level panel dataset of 44 counties from the German state of Baden-Württemberg for the 
period 1995-2005. The results support the pro-enforcement argument. Cumulatively, there is clear 
evidence for a general deterrence effect of enforcement intensity on the amount of illegal waste 
crime. However, regional economic and political economy factors matter significantly for the 
environmental outcomes. Violations appear to be treated differently depending on their local 
political economy context. → 108 Words! 
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1 Introduction 
The enforcement of environmental regulation through sanctions and punishment is widely regarded 
eeffect: Monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulation increases compliance among the 
general population of regulated parties, not only among those directly targeted by past or ongoing 
enforcement activities.  
While these findings lend support to the idea that without enforcement, environmental policy is 
likely to be ineffective, many aspects and policy-relevant dimensions of the deterrence mechanism 
remain poorly understood. This is due both to fundamental challenges of empirical research on 
illegal behavior with its inherent problems of the dark figure of crime (Dills et al. 2009; Levitt and 
Miles 2007) and to the strong regional concentration of research in North America. An up-to-date 
authoritative survey of the recent empirical literature (Gray and Shimshack2011) highlights five 
unresolved issues: A lack of evidence on international experiences regarding the deterrence effect, 
the unclear role of industry characteristics, the relative importance of local factors, the relative 
impact of regulatory tools other than administrative or civil action,and the relationship between 
targeted and general enforcement. The survey concludes that while our understanding has 
improved, there is not enough empirical evidence available in the literature to come to a conclusive 
judgment on how effective different enforcement strategies for environmental regulation are, and 
why. 
The present paper contributes to an ongoing effort among scholars to address some of these 
unresolved issues. Like other papers examining environmental enforcement and compliance, it 
studies compliance in the specific context of waste regulations (Sigman 1998; Alberini and Austin 
1999; Stafford 2002, Stafford 2006). In most OECD countries, waste started to attract regulatory 
attention during the 1970s and has remained an area of focus ever since.i Waste crime has become a 
criminal mainstream activity to such an extent that in the general public's mind, illegal waste 
management has become part and parcel of the standard activities of the typical modern criminal.ii 
As an empirical matter, illegal waste disposal is - at its heart - a crime driven by overwhelmingly 
economic motives. Its benefits are relatively tangible: They materialize in the form of savings from 
bypassing costly environmental regulations and typically increase with its severity.iii These facts 
have led scholars to consider the violation of waste regulations an attractive candidate for studying 
enforcement effects since waste management should, at least in theory, respond particularly well to 
appropriate sanctions that balance the benefits and expected costs of crime in terms of expected 
punishment (Choe and Fraser 1999; Fullerton and Kinnaman 1995, Hoch 1994). The presence of 
such effects has been firmly established in the context of waste regulations in the United States and 
to some extent in the context of general environmental protection in the Czech Republic (Earnhart 
1997, 2000) and Germany (Almer and Goeschl 2010). The present paper is the first to our 
knowledge to examine the important category of waste regulations using international evidence. 
Specifically, the paper examines county-level data on waste crime from the German state of Baden-
Württemberg. This state is not only one of the largest and economically most active of the sixteen 
Landers of the Federal Republic of Germany, it also allows an analysis of high-quality data at the 
level of its 44 counties. In addition to bringing international evidence to bear on the question of 
effective enforcement, the present paper responds to the call for more research on enforcement tools 
for waste regulation other than administrative action (Stafford 2002, 2006) or civil law, e.g. strict 
liability regimes (Sigman 2010).iv The enforcement tool at the center of this paper are criminal 
sanctions on waste crime. These sanctions differ from administrative and civil enforcement tools in 
terms of the severity of sanctions available, up to and including incarceration, and in terms of the 
actors involved, namely police, public prosecutors, and judges at criminal courts. The focus on 
general deterrence in this paper follows, like in Sigman (1998), from the nature of spatially-
disaggregated data on crime rates that is available for analysis. This data consist of enforcement 
variables and the rate of waste crime in 44 different counties within Baden-Württemberg, exploiting 
the significant spatial heterogeneity in the density of manufacturing and chemical production 
activity, population, and local political economy factors within the study area. A related study 
(Almer and Goeschl 2010) established the presence of a general deterrence effect of criminal law on 
environmental crime in general rather than waste crime in particular. That study relied on a spatially 
much coarser dataset of fifteen German states that did not benefit from county-level data due to data 
limitations. Understanding more about the importance of enforcement relative to the potential 
determinants raised by Gray and Shimshack (2011), such as industrial activity and local political 
factors, requires a richer dataset (Cornwell and Trumbull 1994). Using such data, this paper not only 
enhances the degree of spatial resolution and the range of explanatory variables, but also stands as a 
test of replication and robustness of Almer and Goeschl (2010) using a geographical and crime-
specific subsample. Waste crime represents a particularly relevant research target: Not only does 
illegally disposed waste constitute the largest share of environmental crime, it also has greater 
persistence and a spatially more concentrated impact than other types of environmental crime such 
as air pollution. The correspondingly higher incentive for victims to report waste crime relative to 
other environmental crimes facilitates the identification of other factors that are candidates for 
driving variations in reported waste crime, such as local political economy effects. Assessing the 
role of political economy factors is important in order to understand better previous empirical 
evidence on how these factors shape local environmental outcomes through the enforcement 
pathway. In addition to improved spatial resolution and a deeper examination of waste crime, the 
paper also examines the inter-temporal dimension by analyzing the relative importance of long-
term, as opposed to short-term, effects for the various deterrence components under investigation. 
The results of the present paper are threefold. First and foremost, the data support the notion of 
general deterrence through criminal enforcement: A higher probability of facing criminal sanctions 
for illegal waste management leads to a significantly reduced presence of waste-related offences. In 
other words, even though the evidence is drawn from outside the United States and the enforcement 
tool is unusual by international comparison, it confirms the general conclusion drawn on the basis 
of US studies on administrative (Sigman 1998, Stafford 2002) and civil enforcement tools (Sigman 
2010). On the other hand, while broadly comparable in terms of direction and significance, the 
deterrence effects of enforcement variables of waste crime in this particular part of Germany are 
generally weaker than those for generic environmental crime in Germany as a whole (Almer and 
Goeschl 2010), pointing to underlying structural and political economy heterogeneities. 
The second finding is that the choice of the enforcement tool implies a reliance on different 
mechanisms of general deterrence of waste-related offences, and that the data bear this out. In the 
current setting, for example, key deterrents for waste crime are not just the probability of 
punishment (e.g. through incarceration), but also the decision by the public prosecutor to press 
charges in a public court of law. The main impact of this decision is not just to raise the overall 
judicial stakes of a prosecution, but also to bring the presence of a prosecution to the attention of the 
general population for the first time. In many legal systems that protect individual privacy, such 
publicity effects may only be available through criminal law proceedings. This is to be borne in 
mind when comparing different enforcement pathways. The choice of enforcement tools also 
matters in terms of inter-temporal impact: We find that, when considering their cumulative effects 
over five years, changes in the punishment probability and the trial probability give rise to 
substantially larger effects. 
In addition to the general deterrence effect and the evidence on drivers, a third finding is that scale 
effects and various structural determinants impact on the amount of reported waste crime. A number 
of statistical specifications return income and GDP per capita as significant drivers of the number of 
offences. This confirms for the case of waste crime the earlier findings that the level of economic 
activity is a positive driver of general crime (Cornwell and Trumbull 1994), but also of 
environmental crime in the Czech Republic (Earnhart 2004), offences against the Clean Water Act 
(Shimshack and Ward 2005) and hazardous waste violations in the US (Sigman 1998). Our spatially 
more disaggregated level finds that the number of reported illegal waste disposals varies with the 
degree to which a county depends on industry activity in terms of employment (Grepperud 2002) or 
tax income. This evidence supports the notion that one particular pathway through which the 
political economy at the local level determines environmental outcomes is through variations in 
detection and reporting intensity. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop the theoretical 
background that gives rise to four testable hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the data, explains the 
empirical strategy and its robustness, and sets out the econometric specification. Section 4 presents 
the results of the tests of the hypothesis defined in section 2, while section 5 concludes with a short 
discussion.  
 
2 Theoretical Considerations  
This section develops the testable hypotheses that guide the empirical exercise in section 4. Two 
objectives drive the selection of hypotheses. The first objective is a test for the presence of 
deterrence effects in illegal waste management that theory predicts (Choe and Fraser 1999; 
Fullerton and Kinnaman 1995) and US evidence confirmed (Sigman 1998, Stafford 2002). The 
results of this test inform about how the empirical evidence of criminal enforcement of waste 
regulations in a highly industrialized part of Germany compare with the evidence on administrative 
and civil enforcement in the US and with criminal enforcement of generic environmental offences 
in Germany as a whole (Almer and Goeschl 2010). The second objective is to test and extend a 
range of additional determinants of reported illegal activity besides deterrence. This includes 
structural, economic, and political economy factors that influence environmental offences in general 
(Hamilton 1996, Helland 1998, Eckert 2004) and waste offences in particular (Stafford 2002, 
Sigman 2010). As in most other studies of illegal behavior (Cherry and List 2002), the observable 
evidence available for the empirical test is structurally incomplete and presents endogeneity 
problems. We discuss these challenges and their resolution in detail in section 3. 
2.1 General Deterrence  
The theoretical literature on illegal waste disposal (Choe and Fraser 1999; Fullerton and Kinnaman 
1995) emphasizes a rational choice perspective on regulatory violations that has immediate parallels 
with the economic model of crime (Becker 1968). There, the gross benefits of illegal waste disposal 
consist of the avoided cost of proper disposal minus the cost of illegal disposal. The expected costs 
consist of the monetary and non-monetary costs that are associated with expected punishment. 
Under risk-neutrality, its components are the probability of an offender being identified, prosecuted, 
and penalized for illegal waste disposal on the one hand and the economic cost of the penalty on the 
other. Costs comprise both monetary categories such as fines and non-monetary categories such as 
reputation losses and the opportunity cost of spending time in prison. 
The economic model of crime is a statement about decisions by individuals. In the empirical 
literature on the economics of crime, data on the probability of sanctions and on the expected costs 
of crime at the time of decision-making is generally not available at the individual level. Instead, 
researcher rely on data that captures aggregate outcomes in order to test the model. The aggregate 
outcomes that are available for testing an economic model of waste crime for the case of Baden-
Württemberg are, on an annual basis, (i) the share of convicted defendants that were sentenced to 
prison sentences, (ii) the share of convicted defendents that were sentenced to pay a severe fine, (iii) 
the share of defendents that were convicted (found guilty), (iv) the share of suspected waste 
criminals that had to stand trial, and (v) the share of cases for which the police identified and 
apprehended named suspects. These shares can also be summarized (and are known in the 
literature) as different 'rates': The first share, (i), denotes the incarceration (or prison) rate, (ii) the 
penalty rate, (iii) the conviction rate, (iv) the trial rate, and (v) the clearance rate. Analogously, at 
the individual level, these rates can be interpreted as average probabilities of being caught (v), then 
sent to court (iv), then found guilty (iii), then fined (ii), or incarcerated (i), with the understanding 
that individual probabilities will necessarily deviate from those of the average. The shares or rates 
capture the average individual probabilities in hindsight. An empirical question is to what extent 
potential criminals' decisions are determined by current level of these rates or by their levels in the 
recent past. We come to this inter-temporal question below. From a terminological perspective, 
shares, rates, and probabilities ultimately refer to the same empirical indicator and are measured in 
the same way such that these terms will be used somewhat interchangeably in what follows. 
Hypothesis 1 postulates a positive relationship between deterrence and the expected costs of waste 
crime for the average potential criminal. The expectation part of these costs is driven by two 
probabilities: One is the average likelihood of being apprehended for a crime. As explained under 
(v) above, this is known as the 'clearance rate' in the criminological literature. 'Clearance' is 
important because the successful identification of suspected offenders by the police as a prerequisite 
for their apprehension. In the terminology of the police, the crime is 'cleared' and then passed on to 
the prosecution service. A higher clearance rate implies greater probability of being subject to 
criminal investigation, which raises the expected costs of crime. The postulated negative effect of 
an increase in the clearance rate on the incidence of waste crime is also supported by empirical 
evidence from areas other than illegal waste (Cornwell and Trumbull 1994, Cherry and List 2002, 
Baltagi 2006). 
The other probability driving the expected cost of waste crime for the average potential criminal is 
the likelihood of being subject to sanctions (i) through (iv) once apprehended. Each of these 
sanctions imposes different monetary and non-monetary (time, shame) costs on offenders, but each 
sanction also implies a cost of labor, time, physical infrastructure etc. to the public. For the potential 
criminal, a higher probability that one of the sanctions will be imposed raises the cost of illegal 
waste disposal and are hence predicted to reduce reported waste crime. Empirically, this effect has 
been consistently estimated as negative and significant, but with large variations in the elasticity: 
For example, in the case of administrative enforcement of waste regulation in the US, the elasticity 
of reported waste offences with respect to enforcement action is -.18 (Sigman 1998). 
 
Hypothesis 1. Reported waste crime responds negatively to an increased likelihood of criminal 
sanctions: An increase in the (i) incarceration rate, (ii) penalty rate, (iii) conviction rate, (iv) trial 
rate, and (v) clearance rate are each predicted to lead - ceteris paribus - to a reduction in reported 
waste offences. 
 
As explained, the deterrence effect that generates the prediction expressed in hypothesis 1 is 
generated by a number of distinct sanctioning components, (i) through (v), each of which is 
predicted to impact negatively. Provided we are able to confirm hypothesis 1 then the economic 
theory of crime makes further predictions regarding the magnitude of the coefficients (Becker1968): 
The impact of each of these distinct components on the decision whether to commit a crime will be 
in proportion to the cost that it imposes on the criminal in expected terms. For example, prison 
sentences are arguably the costliest form of punishment as they impose on the criminal significant 
costs of time, lost income, and the social stigma attached to prison sentences,reducing future 
employment possibilities. In terms of cost to the criminal, severe fines are the second costliest 
sanction, followed by being convicted (due to reputational losses) and by the reputational losses and 
moderate time cost of having to appear in court (Kahan and Posner 1999, Karpoff et al. 2005). The 
negative response of the reported waste crime to a positive variation in the incarceration rate should 
therefore be stronger than that to an equally sized variation in the penalty rate, which should be 
stronger again than that to the trial rate, and so on. Therefore, hypothesis 2 formulates the following 
prediction. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Reported waste crime is predicted to respond, in absolute terms, most strongly to 
variations in the incarceration rate, and increasingly less strongly to variations in the penalty rate, 
the trial rate, the conviction rate, and the clearance rate. 
 
One key question that both hypotheses 1 and 2 leave open concerns the inter-temporal structure: Is 
it current or past levels of sanctioning that are the drivers of changes in reported waste crime, or 
both? In general, the evidence in the literature points to deterrent effects being driven by 
enforcement activities in the recent past (see e.g. Fajnzylber et al. 2002, Jacob et al. 2007, Rickman 
and Witt 2007). For example, the decision whether to commit a crime early in a given year is likely 
to be based on enforcement activities of the previous year (see also section 3.3). A second key 
question is the likely endogeneity of some of the variables, for example on account of increased 
crime levels in the past leading to more detection effort by police in the present (e.g. Mustard 2003). 
The econometric treatment therefore needs to account for the likely dynamic and endogenous nature 
of the evidence. Section 3.3 presents the methodological answers to this challenge. That section also 
discusses a natural extension of explicitly considering the inter-temporal dimension of the 
deterrence hypotheses 1 and 2. This is to frame them in terms of the cumulative effects of changes 
in enforcement on waste crime over time. 
2.2 Structural Factors  
The price for the parsimony of the economic model of crime in the spirit of Becker (1968) is the 
omission of factors outside the deterrence-compliance nexus that are also drivers of illegal activity. 
As a remedy, much of the general literature on crime includes explanatory variables in order to 
capture the economic and political economy structure within which the illegal activities take place. 
The empirical findings give rise to two hypotheses that gauge the influence of counties' economic 
and political economy structure on illegal disposals. 
We first consider economic issues, namely the level of economic activity across counties. The level 
of economic activity has been hypothesized to determine illegal waste disposal in two ways. One is 
the scale effect: A higher level of economic activity increases the supply of waste that could be 
illegally disposed of (Eckert 2004, Sigman 1998, Stafford 2002). The other is the income effect: 
Counties with a higher income may care more about the environment and thus have a greater 
proclivity to report than counties with lower incomes (Sigman 1998). Both mechanisms predict a 
higher number of reported cases for higher levels of economic activity. We adopt two standard 
measures of activity, GDP per capita and the total revenue of the manufacturing sector. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Reported waste crime is predicted to increase - ceteris paribus - both with GDP per 
capita and with total manufacturing revenue. 
 
The final hypothesis covers factors that bring a recent empirical literature on the political economy 
of the environment to bear on the dataset. Other scholars have explored the extent to which political 
economy may drive environmental outcomes through voting processes (McKitrick 2006) or the 
extent to which the presence of regulatory thresholds influence firm location (Greenstone 2002) 
and, thus, the threat of a loss of industry presence. Gray and Shadbegian (2004) demonstrate for a 
US dataset covering paper mills in 38 states between 1985 and 1997 that regulatory stringency 
responds to the shadow value of industrial activity for the surrounding population. The political 
economy factors explored in this paper are the dependency of a county on industrial activity in 
terms of employment and the dependency of a county on corporate tax receipts from industrial 
activity. On the first of these factors, high levels of employment are a natural objective for 
politicians seeking reelection. Counties that are highly dependent on the employment in the more 
waste-intensive manufacturing sector are argued to find it more costly to enforce environmental 
criminal law and therefore carry out less monitoring. The working hypothesis would therefore 
postulate that in counties with a higher portion of people working in manufacturing industries there 
will be less reporting of environmental offences. A similar line of argument holds for the second 
factor, the share of county corporate tax receipts. These receipts are levied on the profit of 
enterprises located within the county and constitute the single most important source of direct fiscal 
revenues for Germany's counties. However, the relative reliance of counties on corporate taxes 
varies within an order of magnitude. Enforcing costly environmental laws is therefore relatively 
more costly to those counties that depend more heavily on corporate tax income. The working 
hypotheses is then to predict a negative relationship between reported illegal disposals and the share 
of county corporate tax receipts. 
 
Hypothesis 4: A higher number of people working in the manufacturing industry or a higher fraction 
of corporate taxes on total county income leads - ceteris paribus - to a lower rate of reported illegal 
waste disposal. 
 
2.3 Additional Covariates 
In addition to the main variables of interest we include several covariates that are known to impact 
either the occurrence of illegal behavior or the detection and reporting of environmental offences. 
For example, Eckert (2004) postulates and confirms empirically that illegal waste disposals are 
more likely committed in counties with a lower population density. The intuition revolves around 
the probability of detection, which increases with population density. Turning to political variables, 
effort levels of regulators, police, and prosecutors to take action against environmental offences 
could conceivably vary with the political orientation of government. There is evidence from the US 
at the federal and state level that these factors are empirically salient (Helland 1998, Sigman 1998, 
McKitrick 2006). The priority of environmental issues for different parties in Germany is well 
researched (Budge et al. 2001, Klingemann et al. 2007). There is reason therefore to conjecture that 
local governments dominated by the pro-industry conservative party will have a lower incentive to 
have police and prosecutors pursue waste crime aggressively than those with a significant Green 
representation.v 
 
3. Empirics  
3.1 Data  
The empirical exercise relies on panel data analysis. The cross-section of the panel consists of the 
44 counties (Stadt- und Landkreise) of the German state Baden-Würtemberg and, alternatively, the 
17 regional court districts (Landgerichtsbezirke) into which the counties are organized.vi The spatial 
cross-section is combined with time series data covering the years 1995 (1994 in case of reported 
cases and cleared cases) to 2005 with a small subset of counties having incomplete reporting, 
leading to an incomplete panel. 
Data on reported illegal waste disposals and the clearance rate are available at the county level and 
taken from the official police crime statistics (PKS) published by the State Criminal Police Office 
(LKA) of Baden-Württemberg. Data on enforcement variables such as the number of trials, 
convictions and imprisonments are available at the court district level from the official prosecution 
statistics (StVSt) of the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the Federal Statistical Office. Data on 
structural variables that characterize individual counties, such as population, size, economic, 
administrative, political, and several socioeconomic variables, are taken from publications of the 
State Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg. Examples include GDP per capita, industry 
production, the composition of county councils, data reflecting the waste market, county income 
and enforcement resources such as the number of civil servants, prosecutors and judges. 
A common feature in studies of this type is the presence of time lags between identifying a suspect 
and the criminal proceeding. Combined with high variance in reported crime, this can lead to 
observations for which in a given year and county, the number of tried suspects exceeds the number 
of identified suspects. About ten percent of observations in the data set share this characteristic. In 
the absence of individualized data on per-case time lags, the second best response is to allow 
punishment probabilities to exceed one (Cherry 1999). The argument is that causally, the behavior 
of both public and potential offenders is driven by punishment probabilities that are derived on the 
basis of present amounts of crime and present amounts of enforcement. 
Tables 1 and 2 provide variable definitions and summary statistics for all variables included in the 
core econometric specifications. 
 
[Table 1 and 2] 
 
Data for political, structural and waste market variables are not always available for the whole 
period under consideration. This drives our estimation strategy as a two-step process: As a first step, 
the core model as set out in the next section is implemented and estimated in order to use as many 
observations as possible. In a second step, we use different sets of covariates of political, structural, 
economic variables. We thus test whether additional variables that have been identified in the larger 
literature on crime and illegal waste disposals play a plausible role and provide robustness checks. 
3.2 Regression Model  
In this section we develop an empirical model on illegal waste disposals that is at the intersection 
between the crime (Ehrlich 1973, Cornwell and Trumbull 1994, etc.) and the waste regulation 
literature (Sigman 1998, Stafford 2002, etc.). This estimation equation maps a relationship between 
illegal waste disposals on the one hand and enforcement, structural, economic, and political 
economy variables on the other hand. This leads to the following regression model: 
 
CRit = A + αCRit-1 + βPit + γXit + Fi + Tt + εit (1) 
 
where CRit is the natural log of the reported rate of illegal waste disposals in county i in year t and 
A is a constant term. Fi and Tt capture individual county and year effects, respectively. Pit  is a vector 
containing the state- and year-specific probabilities of different levels of punishment for offenders  
located in different counties and court districts, respectively. The vector comprises the clearance 
rate, the rate of tried offenders, the conviction rate, the prison rate, and the rate of people sentenced 
to a severe fine.vii Xit captures economic and political economy factors used in the second step. 
Finally, α, β, γ and ε stand for the parameter (vectors) to be estimated and the disturbance term, 
respectively. In line with recent econometric work on the economics of crime (Fajnzylber et al. 
2002, Rickman and Witt 2007), the specification allows for a lagged dependent variable CRit-1. This 
application of dynamic panel data analysis is justified on account of time persistence in illegal 
waste disposals as we show in the following section. 
3.3 Estimation and Model Selection  
The empirical estimation of economic models of crime involves several challenges, and illegal 
waste disposal is no exception to this well-known rule. First, neglecting the existence of dark 
figures of unreported crime may lead to biased results (Levitt 1998 and McDonald 2001, 2002). The 
reason is that variations in official crime statistics might either be due to variations in actual crime 
or due to variations in detection or reporting. To address this problem, we include - in the second 
step of the analysis - economic and political economy variables that are candidates for influencing 
detection and reporting efforts and thus capture variations in official statistics that are due to the 
dark figure. This strategy aims at disentangling changes in both the amount of actual crime and the 
amount of detected crimes when the true amount of crime is not observable. 
Second, different types of endogeneity might bias later results if they are not controlled for properly. 
Mustard (2003) shows, e.g. that there is evidence for an omitted variable bias if one does not 
include conviction probabilities and time served in prison in the empirical exercise. We address this 
issue by including variables for all 4 stages of the German enforcement process (see section 2) in 
our later analysis. Another source of endogeneity emerges when aggregating different types of 
crime to one aggregated index. Cherry and List (2002) show that deterrence effects are different for 
different types of crime and adding up the data to one index leads to biased results. In our analysis, 
we focus exclusively on illegal waste disposals which are regulated by one specific article in the 
German Penal Code. Moreover, several earlier studies used cross-sectional data to test the economic 
model of crime. Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) and Cherry (1999) show that not being able to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity may then cause biased results. We use panel data to address 
this challenge explicitly. Finally, the estimation may conceivably suffer from simultaneity in that 
enforcement not only affects crime, but crime also enforcement. Simultaneity issues are discussed 
in detail in section 4.3.2. 
Third, the recent literature on illegal activities shows (Fajnzylber et al. 2002, Rickman and Witt 
2007, Jacob et al. 2007) that crime rates often exhibit a considerable degree of persistency.viii This 
requires the use of appropriate estimation techniques such as dynamic panel data analysis (Arellano 
and Bond 1991 and Arellano and Bover 1995). As we show in the following section, there is 
evidence for a dynamic structure in our dataset. Finally, as mentioned in section 2, the temporal 
structure between enforcement and deterrence may be subject to time lags. Other authors, looking at 
evidence on drug crime and violent crime, have found evidence for a lagged deterrence effect for 
selected components of the enforcement system (Corman and Mocan 2000, Mustard 2003). We 
examine the lagged nature of deterrence in section 4.3.2 for waste crime and find evidence for a 
lagged deterrence effect for prison rates. 
In the next two subsections, we discuss different specification tests and account for simultaneity and 
time lags before we move on to interpret the results in section 4.4. 
3.3.1 Specification Tests  
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates for the core model and for different estimation procedures. 
'FE' indicates the standard fixed-effects model. 'Sys. GMM' stands for the Arellano and Bover 
(1995)/Blundell and Bond (1998) one-step system GMM estimator with robust standard errors. The 
choice of the most appropriate estimation procedure among FE and GMM is a matter of data 
characteristics. 
The parameter estimates for the lagged dependent variable (columns 2-6) show a significant degree 
of persistency. This rules out FE as an appropriate choice and justifies the use of dynamic panel 
estimators. Using all available internal instruments when applying GMM, the Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions gives some reason for caution for the specification displayed in column 
3 of Table 3.ix Given that there is evidence not only for ar(1) but also ar(2) (and no evidence for 
ar(3)) we restrict the set of instruments in later specifications. In particular, we control for ar(2) by 
restricting the number of lags of the dependent variable to serve as instruments to 3+ in the 
specification in column 4 (Table 3). Under this specification, the Sargan test no longer rejects the 
Null of validity of the overidentifying restrictions at common significance levels. 
 
[Table 3] 
 
3.3.2 Simultaneity and Lag Structure 
Beginning with Ehrlich (1973), there is a ongoing discussion on simultaneity when estimating the 
economic model of crime empirically. There is always the possibility of both potential criminals 
responding to changes in enforcement efforts and enforcement institutions responding to changes in 
the behavior of criminals. Observing an increasing crime rate, police, prosecutors and courts may 
tend to increase efforts in order to keep the amount of crimes at an acceptable level. Simultaneity is 
therefore of special interest for the included enforcement variables. In contrast, it is implausible that 
the amount of illegal waste disposals affects the economic, political or structural composition of a 
county. To control for potential simultaneity, we therefore estimate the core model (column 4 in 
Table 3) treating the different enforcement variables as being endogenous in GMM. The results are 
displayed in columns 5 and 6 (Table 3). 
 
[Table 4] 
 
The results make clear that two parameter estimates are particularly vulnerable with respect to an 
endogenous model specification. First, the effect for clearance rates becomes both economically and 
statistically less significant. Second, prison rates exhibit a positive and now significant effect on 
illegal waste disposals. All remaining enforcement variables still have a negative sign and are 
significant in case of the rate of tried offenders. 
Temporal delays in the causal relationships between enforcement and deterrence are a second 
challenge (see section 2). To test whether enforcement variables exhibit a lagged effect on criminal 
behavior, we re-estimate the model in column 1 and 2 of Table 4 including the first lag of the prison 
rate. The intuition for this is that it is usually the case that prosecution time increases with the 
severity of the offence. At the same time, potential offenders are likely to devote particular attention 
to the outcome of severe cases when judging the probability of receiving a prison sentence. We find 
a significant negative effect of the lagged prison rate with the contemporaneous prison rate 
becoming insignificant in case of the FE specification in column 1 (Table 4). The data set therefore 
lends support to the conjecture that increases in the rate of incarceration give rise to lagged 
deterrence effect. In fact, by estimating a specification using lags for all enforcement variables 
(Table 6, left panel), we only observe a lagged deterrence effect for prison rates. 
3.4 Estimation Results 
3.4.1 Deterrence 
The results of the econometric estimation, contained in tables 3 and 4, broadly confirm Hypothesis 
1 both in terms of direction and magnitudes. Among the different steps, three deterrence 
components deserve special mention. The first is the clearance rate, i.e. the police effort dedicated at 
identifying offenders responsible for illegal waste disposals. The predicted relationship between 
clearance rate and reported crime rates is a negative one. The econometric estimates for clearance 
rates bear out this prediction, returning a negative sign (with one exception) but being not 
significant for our endogenous GMM specifications. This could be due to informational obstacles 
(clearance is difficult to observe for potential offenders) and due to the endogenous link between 
clearance rates and the volume of waste crime: The increased deterrence of police effort leads to 
less waste crime, which in turn leads to reduced need for police effort. 
The second important deterrence component is the rate of tried offenders. Its elasticities range from 
-.14 to -.46 (Tables 3 and 4) and are highly significant in almost all specifications. The third 
noteworthy determinant of deterrence is the incarceration rate, lagged. Here, elasticities range from 
-.7 to -1 (Table 4) with strong significance across specifications. That is, a one (within-county) 
standard deviation increase in the rate of tried offenders (.34) would imply a decrease in the amount 
of waste crime by 1.04 - 1.92 cases. Similarly, a one (within-county) standard deviation increase in 
the prison rate (.06) would imply a reduction in waste crime of 0.8 - 1.15 cases. The results for 
other deterrence variables, conviction rates and the rate of severe fines, are also in line with the 
theoretical predictions and, though not directly comparable, with empirical estimates from waste 
offences in the US. Both show negative parameter estimates for almost all specifications, but do not 
cross the significance hurdle at the 10% level (tables 3 and 4). 
Given the suspected lagged deterrence effects (see section 3.1.), we estimate specifications 
including multiple lags of all punishment variables. Table 5 in the appendix (left panel) shows in 
particular a specification including lags 0 and 1. Apart from the prison rate, we do not find evidence 
for a lagged deterrence effect for any other punishment variable.x Table 5 (right panel) also contains 
results for the cumulative effects (long-run elasticities) for the specification with lags 0 and 1 
(column 1) and for the cumulative effects for the lags 0-4 (column 2). Both specifications confirm 
the importance of the rate of tried offenders and the prison rate with the 5 years cumulative effects 
(lags 0-4) being even larger than the short-run elasticities ( tried: -1.7; prison: -5.3). 
 
Result 1: There is evidence for a cumulative deterrence effect on the rate of illegal waste disposal of 
enforcement action comprising clearance, trial of offenders, conviction, fines, and incarceration. As 
predicted by hypothesis 1, the individual sanctioning components return negative estimates, with 
significant key drivers being the rate of tried offenders and the prison rate, lagged. 
 
Hypothesis 2 stresses the relative contribution of the different enforcement components to aggregate 
deterrence. Examining tables 3 and 4, the conjecture of deterrence increasing in severity contained 
in Hypothesis 2 is partially borne out in the data. Leaving aside the insignificant parameter 
estimates, the elasticity of the crime rate with respect to the rate of incarceration consistently 
exceeds that with respect to the rate of tried offenders. This leads to result 2. 
 
Result 2: The relative contributions of different enforcement components to aggregate deterrence 
effect partially confirm hypothesis 2. For the prison rate and the rate of tried offenders, the 
elasticities with respect to deterrence vary in line with the severity of the sanction. 
 
Results 1 and 2 jointly provide evidence that the criminal enforcement of waste regulations in 
Baden-Württemberg generates a general deterrence effect. This adds robustness to previous findings 
in two significant ways. It means that despite a different enforcement tool and a different 
geographical setting, we find an effect that is similar to the deterrence effects established in the 
context of waste regulations in the US (Sigman 1998; Stafford 2002; Sigman 2010) and generic 
environmental crime in Germany (Almer and Goeschl 2010). At the same time, compared to the 
results on administrative and civil action in the US (Sigman 1998; Stafford 2002; Sigman 2010), the 
results also make clear that different components of the enforcement chain contribute in different 
ways to general deterrence, and that some components can be more relied upon than others to result 
in increased deterrence. The choice of enforcement tool therefore matters greatly in terms of policy 
outcome. Our results also suggest that deterrence effects are even stronger in the long run. That is, 
persistent enforcement efforts seem to be particularly helpful in avoiding illegal waste disposals. 
3.4.2 Structural Factors 
 Here we summarize the results for the structural factors of an economic and political economy type 
that are included in the specifications displayed in Table 4. The results for the economic activity 
variables are in line with the predictions of Hypothesis 3: Revenue generated in the manufacturing 
industry shows positive parameter estimates with elasticities ranging between .4 and 1.31 and 
estimates are significant at the 10 percent level in column 4 and close to significance at the 10% 
level in columns 3 and 6 of Table 4. The results for GDP per capita are similar: Estimates are 
positive and in most cases significant (columns 5 and 6) with elasticities of 3.4 and 4.2. 
 
Result 3: There is evidence for scale effects in the crime rate: Both the revenue of the 
manufacturing sector and GDP per capita have a positive impact on illegal disposals. 
 
Hypothesis 4 focused on the dependence of a county on the manufacturing industry, providing a 
causal channel from dependence to lenience in detection, reporting, and prosecution. Both 
indicators for the degree of dependency show the expected negative sign and are highly significant 
in case of corporate tax revenue. Elasticities in case of system GMM are -.48 for the share of county 
corporate tax revenue in county total income and between -1.4 and 1.6 for the share of county 
population working in the manufacturing industry. However, whereas estimates for the employment 
variable are only significant in case of FE, the estimates for corporate taxes are significant for both 
system GMM and one FE specification. 
 
Result 4: There is evidence for a local political economy effect driving environmental crime rates. 
For both the share of county populations working in the manufacturing industry and the share of 
county corporate tax income in total county income, a negative relationship between local 
dependence on industry and the amount of reported illegal disposals is plausible on the basis of the 
consistent and in case of corporate taxes highly significant parameter estimates. 
 
Result 4 is not conclusive evidence for, but consistent with a narrative in which counties that are 
highly dependent on a prospering industry show a lower rate of reported illegal disposals. Counties 
with a higher share of people working in the manufacturing sector show a lower rate of reported 
illegal waste disposals. The results for the share of county corporate tax revenue in total county 
income point in the same direction. This findings are novel in that the existing literature on illegal 
waste disposals only included more general structural variables likes GDP per capita, income per 
capita, population density or conventional political variables (Sigman 1998, Stafford 2002, Helland 
1998). 
 3.4.3 Additional Covariates 
 For the additional covariates capturing other structural and political factors included in Table 5, the 
results are mixed. We test, for example, whether detection probabilities - by the way of population 
densities - drive environmental crime rates. Looking at tables 3 and 4, such a correlation fails to 
emerge: Parameter estimates for population density are positive throughout but only significant for 
one specification (column 4 in Table 3). Conjectures regarding the relationship between political 
factors and reported environmental crime lead to similar results. Testing for the presence of such a 
relationship in the data returns highly variable parameter estimates for the share of conservatives 
and greens in county councils and little significant results. This is not unexpected. Both county 
councils and the state government of Baden-Württemberg have been dominated by the conservative 
party (CDU) for more than 50 years. 
 
 4 Conclusion  
Understanding how enforcement can support effective environmental policy is of interest to 
scholars and policy-makers alike. While there is an emerging consensus on the deterrence effect of 
enforcement, there is also agreement that the evidence in favor is limited with respect to 
geographical scope, enforcement tools, and regulatory context. By bringing international evidence 
on criminal enforcement in the waste context to the fore, the present paper contributes to a wider 
effort to overcome the limitations of the currently available evidence. 
The main message of the paper supports the emerging consensus that the presence of a deterrence 
effect in environmental regulation is independent of geographical location, the enforcement tool, 
and the regulatory context. Cumulatively, we find clear evidence for a general deterrence effect of 
enforcement intensity on the amount of reported waste crime in the German state of Baden-
Württemberg, one of the economically most active Landers in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Despite the limitations of the evidence base, the emphasis on deterrence as a pillar of effective 
environmental policy can thus be extrapolated more confidently. 
While providing further substance for the universality of the deterrence hypothesis, the paper also 
adds subtlety by emphasizing that criminal enforcement relies on different drivers than 
administrative and civil sanctions. This subtlety also applies to the regional factors that reflect the 
economic and political economy processes operating at lower levels of spatial aggregation. 
Regional factors enter in several ways. They are a likely explanation for differences in the 
deterrence effect between Germany as a whole and the specific case of Baden-Württemberg. 
Finally, the data supports the emerging notion in the empirical literature that local political economy 
matters in measurable ways for the effective implementation of environmental regulation. 
We emphasize that the usual caveats of the empirical literature on environmental crime, and the 
economics of crime in general, apply to our results. Perpetrators of waste crime do not voluntarily 
disclose the nature and volume of their activities. Efforts from either second (victims) and third 
parties (public agents or unaffected by-standers) are required to make waste crime observable. 
While waste crime is less likely to be underreported by victims than other types of environmental 
crime, thus facilitating identification of deterrence and structural effects, this could give rise to 
second-order effects. For example, waste criminals might invest more effort into concealment 
activities. While this would not invalidate our results, it could weaken the magnitude of the 
estimated effects. It is also important to point out that the results do not provide normative guidance 
on environmental regulation and its enforcement. Enforcement, while evidently effective, is costly, 
and the empirical results cannot speak to the issue of how much enforcement is effcient. While we 
find that political economy factors are present and weaken the effectiveness of regulation, their 
presence is not necessarily harmful to welfare. It could constitute a meaningful local response to 
excessively rigid guidelines at the federal or state level. 
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Variable Definition
Rate of illegal waste disposals (CR) Number of reported cases divided by population  
Clearance rate (clear) share of cases for which suspects are identified 
Rate of tried suspects (tried) share of identified suspects brought to court 
Conviction rate (convicted) share of accused suspects convicted in court 
Prison rate (prison) share of convicted offenders receiving a prison sentence 
Rate of severe fines (fine) share of convicted offenders receiving a heavy fine 
Population density (pop.den) population divided by county size 
Share of greens (greens) share of Green Party politicians in county council 
Share of conservatives (conservatives) share of CDU politicians in county council 
natural log of real GDP per capita 
natural log of real revenue of the manufacturing sector 
nat. log of population working in manufacturing sector 
Importance of corporate taxes (corp.tax) nat. log of corporate taxes divided by county income
GDP per capita (gdp) 
Total revenue in manufacturing (rev.manu) 
Share of employees in manufacturing sector (emp.manu) 
Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CR 505 0.00009 0.00008 0 0.00065
clear 526 0.67366 0.24974 0 1
tried 468 0.52243 0.4124 0.06667 3.66667
convicted 470 0.73923 0.19131 0 1
prison 467 0.02972 0.0658 0 0.5
fine 467 0.0509 0.11388 0 1
pop.den 528 5.2732 6.55267 1.02939 76.41714
greens 528 0.08341 0.04463 0 0.27083
conservatives 528 0.41076 0.07419 0.24138 0.56522
gdp 440 29889 8527 19544 58335
rev.manu 484 5445835 4937229 707989 34700000
emp.manu 440 0.09062 0.13352 0.00795 0.69395
cor.tax 350 0.43732 0.13119 0.11511 0.91859
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
  
 
FE FE Sys GMM Sys GMM Sys GMM Sys GMM
CR, lag 0.309 0.306 0.38 0.512 0.47
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
cleared  -0.201 -0.24  -0.524  -0.598  -0.108  -0.101
(0.466) (0.325) (0.025) (0.014) (0.627) (0.649)
tried  -0.179  -0.232  -0.264  -0.327  -0.253  -0.259
(0.065) (0.049) (0.033) (0.009) (0.026) (0.041)
convicted -0.164  -0.176 -0.0217  -0.141  -0.131  -0.172
(0.328) (0.312) (0.926) (0.558) (0.504) (0.358)
prison 0.28 0.195 0.651 0.442 0.798 0.9
(0.424) (0.549) (0.103) (0.250) (0.033) (0.022)
fine  -0.320  -0.177  -0.356  -0.303  -0.177 -0.138
(0.337) (0.527) (0.237) (0.305) (0.508) (0.623)
pop.den 5.035 5.588 0.139 0.708  0.0616
(0.405) (0.199) (0.588) (0.024) (0.722)
green 0.0025  0.0485  0.0981  -0.243  -0.104
(0.988) (0.702) (0.801) (0.593) (0.622)
conservatives 0.613  0.0473  -0.594 1.432  -0.252
(0.561) (0.952) (0.545) (0.145) (0.642)
N 421 407 407 407 427 407
R2 within  .134  .248
R2 between 0.0004  .0043
Specification Tests 
Sargan (.0525)  (.206) -0.181 -0.137
Autocorrelation
First Order (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000)
Second Order (.0566) (.0583) -0.12 -0.0982
Third Order  (.953)  (.936) -0.486 -0.518
Note: Time dummies and a constant have been included but omitted here. P-values in 
parenthesis. All GMM specifications (implemented in Stata 12 via xtdpd and xtdpdsys, 
respectively) have been applied using one-step system GMM with robust standard errors (not 
for obtaining the Sargan statistic). Columns 5 and 6 display estimates for the endogenous 
specication (i.e., treating all deterrence variables as being endogenous).
Table 3: Estimation Results for Core Equation 
  
 
FE Sys GMM FE FE Sys GMM Sys GMM
CR,lag 0.278 0.495 0.264 0.231 0.277 0.205
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.016) (0.064) (0.158)
cleared -0.272 0.0164 -0.125 -0.0876 -0.414 -0.43
(0.358) (0.944) (0.632) (0.745) (0.163) (0.140)
tried -0.158 -0.188 -0.252 -0.144 -0.461 -0.435
(0.101) (0.082) (0.154) (0.341) (0.008) (0.008)
convicted -0.135 -0.12 -0.14 -0.168 0.0728 0.07
(0.499) (0.531) (0.555) (0.473) (0.787) (0.773)
prison -0.101 0.721 -0.0168 -0.0415 -0.0125 0.228
(0.787) (0.096) (0.962) (0.912) (0.970) (0.499)
prison,lag -0.992 -0.922 -0.85 -0.872 -0.999 -0.693
(0.051) (0.017) (0.113) (0.131) (0.038) (0.106)
fine -0.144 -0.136 -0.244 -0.258 -1.013 -1.026
(0.601) (0.617) (0.628) (0.620) (0.086) (0.061)
pop.den 7.053 0.0717 3.619 0.381
(0.170) (0.666) (0.665) (0.670)
green 0.181 -0.0399 0.0205 -0.37
(0.248) (0.832) (0.894) (0.193)
conservatives 0.479 -0.251 1.109 0.946
(0.534) (0.646) (0.298) (0.579)
manu.rev 1.089 1.306 0.402 0.71
(0.112) (0.080) (0.224) (0.140)
gdp.cap 1.566 1.383 4.246 3.426
(0.313) (0.382) (0.025) (0.080)
cor.tax -0.233 -0.311 -0.478 -0.478
(0.159) (0.082) (0.022) (0.036)
emp.manu -3.072 -3.439 -1.577 -1.411
(0.089) (0.062) (0.219) (0.335)
N 363 363 285 275 285 275
R2within 0.199 0.257 0.234
R2between 0.0037 0.0309 0.0097
SpecificationTests
Sargan (.289) (.377) (.452)
Autocorrelation
FirstOrder (.0000) (.0009) (.0012)
SecondOrder (.061) (.261) (.368)
ThirdOrder (.973) (.84) (.652)
Note: Time dummies and a constant have been included but omitted here. P-values in 
parenthesis. 
Table 4: Estimation Results for Time Lags and Extended Model 
  
                                                 
i According to the EPA (2006), parties involved in hazardous waste pollution in the U.S. in 2006 had to pay a total of 
$391 Mill. to study and clean up contamination of 15 million cubic yards soil and 1.3 billion cubic yards ground 
water. 
ii Tony Soprano, arguably the eponymous fictional rendering of the modern criminal, lists his main occupation as 
"waste management consultant" at Barone Sanitation. 
iii According to some estimates, disposal of a 55-gallon drum of hazardous waste by incineration typically costs US$ 
1000 (Sullivan 2002). These costs are multiples, if not an order of magnitude greater than the cost of disposing 
non-hazardous waste. 
iv See also the comparative study of administrative and civil enforcement tools in the context of the US chemical 
industry by Glicksman and Earnhart (2007). 
v Witzke and Urfei (2001) find a close relationship between support for the Green Party and willingness-to-pay for 
environmental protection in Germany. 
vi For more information on how illegal waste disposal is regulated by the German Penal Code, see Almer and 
 Goeschl (2010). 
vii Information about fines and prison sentences are not available in their true magnitude but only in intervals. It is 
therefore not possible to construct plausible variables for the severity of punishment. 
viii By persistency we mean that even though we observe substantial variation in our explanatory variables within 
 counties over time, the observed variation is very likely not enough to lead to no crime or a drastic increase in 
 crime from one year to another. We therefore expect the amount of waste crime to remain relatively stable over 
time. This assumption is confirmed by the estimate for the lagged dependent variable displayed in Tables 3 and 
 4. Similar arguments apply for our explanatory variables, e.g. due to budget constraints in law enforcement. 
ix With significance at the 10% level, the test questions whether the chosen instruments (lags 2+ of the  dependent 
variable) are appropriate to correct for the Nickell (1981) bias. 
x However, there is evidence for a lagged positive effect for the clearance rate that cancels out the negative 
contemporaneous effect (right panel). 
Sys GMM (1) (2)
CR,lag 0.522 (0.001) cleared -0.0145 0.937
cleared -0.454 (0.113) (0.967) (0.310)
cleared,lag 0.44 (0.078) tried -0.498 -1.676
tried -0.391 (0.002) (0.00646) (0.00181)
tried,lag -0.107 (0.341) convicted -0.102 1.457
convicted -0.0527 (0.847) (0.788) (0.235)
convicted,lag -0.0493 (0.829) prison -0.939 -5.257
prison -0.041 (0.907) (0.122) (0.0201)
prison,lag -0.898 (0.081) fine -0.101 0.794
fine -0.366 (0.246) (0.845) (0.648)
fine,lag 0.265 (0.573) N 363 238
pop.den 0.31 (0.366)
greens -0.482 (0.092)
conservative 1.15 (0.263)
N 363
SpecificationTests
Sargan (0.226)
Autocorrelation
FirstOrder (0.0002)
SecondOrder (0.0413)
ThirdOrder (0.344)
Note: p-values in parentheses. Cumulative 
effects for all punishment variables based on 
the the core specification in Table 3 and the 
corresponding time lags. Column 1 displays 
cumulative estimates for the specification in 
the left panel (including lags 0 and 1) and 
estim tes i  c lumn 2 a e based on lags 0 to 4 
of all punishm nt variables.
Not : p-values in parentheses. Extension of 
ur c re model (see Table 3) including lags 
for all punishment variables.
Table 5: Lagged Effects and Long-Run Elasticities 
